Contracts to Devise Realty -- Sufficiency of Will as Memo for Statute of Frauds by Saslow, Everett B., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 54 | Number 5 Article 13
6-1-1976
Contracts to Devise Realty -- Sufficiency of Will as
Memo for Statute of Frauds
Everett B. Saslow Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Everett B. Saslow Jr., Contracts to Devise Realty -- Sufficiency of Will as Memo for Statute of Frauds, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 976 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol54/iss5/13
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Contracts to Devise Realty-Sufficiency of Will as Memo for
Statute of Frauds
Upon breach of a contract to devise realty, an aggrieved party may
be awarded specific performance of the contract or damages only if the
contract complies with the Statute of Frauds.' Consequently, courts are
often called upon to decide whether a certain contract to devise meets
with the Statutes requirements, especially the requirement of a writing.
In Rape v. Lyerly2 the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the first
time that a revoked will constituted a written memorandum of an oral
contract to devise sufficient to comply with North Carolina's Statute of
Frauds. 3  Through the legal fiction of a constructive trust, the court
granted specific performance of the contract. Upon examination, the
conclusions of the court appear to be sound ones.
The Rape case arose out of an alleged oral contract between James
Lyerly and the Rapes.' In return for the Rapes' living with him and
serving his needs, Lyerly promised to leave his property to Mrs. Rape,
his daughter, by will. In 1959 Lyerly executed and delivered to the
Rapes a will devising to Mrs. Rape all of his real property. 5 The Rapes
fully performed their promise; yet Lyerly in 1969 executed a second
will, revoking the 1959 will and devising only part of his real estate to
the Rapes." At Lyerly's death, Mrs. Rape's surviving children brought
suit to enforce specifically the provisions of the oral contract. The other
devisees under the 1969 will defended on the ground that the Statute of
Frauds makes void any oral contract to convey real estate. Afffirming a
1. North Carolina's Statute of Frauds is N.C. Gm. STAT. § 22-2 (1965). It
provides: "All contracts to sell or convey any lands . . . shall be void unless said
contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the party
to be charged therewith. .. ."
2. 287 N.C. 601, 215 S.E.2d 737 (1975).
3. Id. at 615, 215 S.E.2d at 746.
4. The Rapes are Mildred Lyerly Rape, deceased daughter of James Lyerly, and
Basil M. Rape. Id. at 610, 215 S.E.2d at 743.
5. 287 N.C. at 604, 215 S.E.2d at 739. The will stated:
"Fourth: It is my opinion that $16,000.00 is a fair market value of my real
property lying in Steele Township, Rowan County, N.C. Since my daughter,
Mildred Lyerly Rape and my son, Woodrow W. Lyerly have obligated them-
selves to care for my wife and myself during our lifetime, all of my real prop-
erty, I give and bequeath to Mildred Lyerly Rape upon payment by her to the
following: 1st. To my son, Woodrow W. Lyerly the sum of $6,000.00. 2nd.
To my son, Gray Lyerly the sum of $1,000.00 3rd. To my daughter, Kath-
erine Lyerly Mack the sum of $1,000.00."
6. Id. at 605, 215 S.E.2d at 740.
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superior court judgment for the Rapes, 7 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals determined that the 1959 will "provided a sufficient memoran-
dum of the agreement to comply with the Statute of Frauds."'8 On
appeal, Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the North Carolina Supreme
Court, agreed with the lower courts and ordered specific performance of
the contract for the plaintiffs' benefit.
Although the Statute of Frauds speaks only of contracts to "sell or
convey" land, North Carolina cases clearly establish that the scope of
North Carolina's Statute of Frauds9 includes contracts to devise.10 Thus
oral contracts to devise realty not evidenced by a sufficient writing,
memorandum, or note are void and unenforceable. 1 Upon breach of
parol contracts to devise, only actions in quantum meruit or implied
assumpsit will lie in favor of an aggrieved party.'2 In quantum meruit
actions, the promisee recovers only the value of the services that he has
rendered; the promisee cannot recover the benefit of his bargain or the
value of the realty that had been promised him.'8 The few North
Carolina cases that awarded money damages for the breach .of or
specifically enforced an oral contract to devise not evidenced by a
writing'14 have been expressly or impliedly overruled.
1 5
7. Rape v. Lyerly, 23 N.C. App. 241, 208 S.E.2d 712 (1974).
8. Id. at 247, 208 S.E.2d at 716.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849 (1970); Jamerson v.
Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948); Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d
764 (1947); Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224 N.C. 103, 29 S.E.2d 206 (1944);
Hicks v. Hicks, 13 N.C. App. 347, 185 S.E.2d 430 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962);
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Humphrey v. Faison, 247 N.C.
127, 100 S.E.2d 524 (1957); Clapp v. Clapp, 241 N.C. 281, 85 S.E.2d 153 (1954);
Daughtry v. Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943); Grantham v. Grantham,
205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
12. See, e.g., Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962);
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540,
46 S.E.2d 561 (1948); Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947); Grady v.
Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760 (1944); Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224
N.C. 103, 29 S.E.2d 206 (1944); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331
(1933); Brown v. Williams, 196 N.C. 241, 145 S.E. 233 (1928); Edwards v. Matthews,
196 N.C. 39, 144 S.E. 300 (1928); Faircloth v. Kinlaw, 165 N.C. 228, 81 S.E. 299
(1914); Miller v. Lash, 85 N.C. 45 (1881); Hicks v. Hicks, 13 N.C. App. 347, 185
S.E.2d 430 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Wells v. Foreman, 236 N.C. 351, 72 S.E.2d 765; Stewart v. Wyrick,
228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947); Grady v. Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760
(1944); Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583, 194 S.E. 284 (1937).
14. Lipe v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 207 N.C. 794, 178 S.E. 665 (1935); Hager
v. Whitener, 204 N.C. 747, 169 S.E. 645 (1933); Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150
S.E. 881 (1929); Lipe v. Houck, 128 N.C. 115, 38 S.E. 297 (1901).
15. Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962); Grantham v.
Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
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Other North Carolina cases on contracts to devise realty clearly
establish that a written contract to devise is enforceable."' Although an
aggrieved party to a written contract to devise is entitled to bring an
action to recover money damages, both according to the general rule1"
and to a few North Carolina cases,18 the more common remedy for
breach is in the nature of specific performance.1 9 North Carolina case
law often speaks of specifically enforcing a contract by making one of
the testator's devisees or heirs at law a constructive trustee of the realty
for the aggrieved plaintiff.2" Some cases purport to grant specific
performance only when it would be equitable to do so, 21 but North
Carolina courts have yet to deny a claimant recovery on equitable
grounds.
When a promisor performs his oral contract to devise realty by
executing a will and then revokes, the issue becomes whether a will can
constitute a memorandum of the contract sufficient for the Statute of
Frauds.22 Prior to Rape, no appellate court case in North Carolina had
held that a revoked will is a sufficient memorandum for this purpose.2
16. See, e.g., Schoolfield v. Collins, 281 N.C. 604, 189 S.E.2d 208 (1972);
McCraw v. Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962); Clark v. Butts, 240 N.C.
709, 83 S.E.2d 885 (1954); Chambers v. Byers, 214 N.C. 373, 199 S.E. 398 (1938);
Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933); Stockard v. Warren, 175
N.C. 283, 95 S.E. 579 (1918); Earnhardt v. Clement, 137 N.C. 91, 49 S.E. 49 (1904);
Price v. Price, 133 N.C. 494, 45 S.E. 855 (1903); East v. Dolihite, 72 N.C. 562 (1875).
17. B. SPApms, CoNTRAcrs TO MAKn WLrs 136 (1956).
18. Halsey v. Snell, 214 N.C. 209, 198 S.E. 633 (1938).
19. The remedy is "in the nature of specific performance" because the effect of the
contract is carried out. Truly, there could not be specific performance of an act made
physically impossible by the promisor's death. Yet, as SPARKS, supra note 17, at 156
notes, it is pointless to say that specific performance actually is not being carried out.
20. See, e.g., Chambers v. Byers, 214 N.C. 373, 377-78, 199 S.E. 398, 401 (1938);
Stockard v. Warren, 175 N.C. 283, 285, 95 S.E. 579, 580 (1918), quoting from an
annotation following Naylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S.W. 117 (1912), in 31 Am. &
Eng. Ann. Cas. 1917A, 394, 399:
"[While a court of chancery is without power to compel the execution of a
will, and therefore the specific execution of an agreement to make a will can-
not be enforced, yet if the contract is sufficiently proved and appears to have
been binding on the decedent, and the usual conditions relating to specific
performance have been complied with, then equity will specifically enforce it
by seizing the property which is the subject matter of the agreement, and fas-
tening a trust on it in favor of the person to whom the decedent agreed to
give it by his will."
See also Clark v. Butts, 240 N.C. 709, 83 S.E.2d 885 (1954).
21. See, e.g., Earnhardt v. Clement, 137 N.C. 91, 49 S.E. 49 (1904), requiring that
the contract be for a valuable and fair consideration, be fair and just and mutual, not be
procured by undue influence or imposition, be performed fully and faithfully by the
aggrieved, and not result in an oppressive or harsh or inequitable decree.
22. Where a promisor performs his oral contract to devise realty by executing a
will which is subsequently declared invalid, also at issue is whether the will can
constitute a memorandum of the contract sufficient for'the Statute of Frauds.
23. 23 N.C. App. at 246, 208 S.E.2d at 716.
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One North Carolina Supreme Court decision, McCraw v. Llewellyn,2 4
held that a particular revoked will did not of itself constitute a sufficient
memo and, in so holding, implied that a revoked will could constitute a
sufficient memo for Statute of Frauds purposes. As a general rule,
commentators25 and courts26 have agreed that a revoked will can serve
as a sufficient memo of a contract to devise. Courts in a substantial
number of other jurisdictions have implied, while holding that the
specific will at issue was not evidence of an oral contract, that a revoked
will could be a sufficient memo of a contract to devise.
In deciding whether a revoked will is a memo of the oral contract
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, at issue is the content of the
writing, not its form.18 Generally required are the names of the parties,
the signature of the party to be charged, the terms and conditions of the
contract, a description of the property, and all essential elements of the
undertaking. 2 North Carolina cases require the will to include a
written expression of the intent and obligation of the parties3 0-specifi-
cally, the price for the realty,31 a description of the realty,32 and the
24. 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962).
25. See e.g., Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 921 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Potter v. Bland, 136 Cal. App. 2d 125, 288 P.2d 569 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Maddox v. Rowe, 23 Ga. 431 (1857); Holsz v. Stephen, 362 Ill. 527, 200
N.E. 601 (1936); Falk v. Fulton, 124 Kan. 745, 262 P. 1025 (1928); Nelson
v. Schoonover, 89 Kan. 388, 131 P. 147 (1913); Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 147,
97 S.W. 901 (1906); Woods v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159 P. 1158 (1916); In re Anderson's
Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A.2d 301 (1944); Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310, 54 A. 24
(1903); Upson v. Fitzgerald, 129 Tex. 211, 103 S.W.2d 147 (1937); In re Lube's Estate,
225 Wis. 365, 274 N.W. 276 (1937).
27. Brought v. Howard, 30 Ariz. 522, 249 P. 76 (1926); Kobus v. San Diego Trust
& Say. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Luders v.
Security Trust & Savings Bank, 121 Cal. App. 408, 9 P.2d 271 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932);
Southern v. Kittredge, 85 N.H. 307, 158 A. 132 (1932); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 66 N.J.
Super. 246, 168 A.2d 839 (App. Div. 1961); Hunt v. Hunt, 55 App. Div. 430, 66 N.Y.S.
957 (1900), afjfd, 171 N.Y. 396, 64 N.E. 159 (1902); Wilson v. Dunkle, 71 Ohio L.
Abs. 483, 132 N.E.2d 483 (Licking County C.P. 1955); Eslick v. Friedman, 191 Tenn.
647, 235 S.W.2d 808 (1951); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138, 137 P. 479
(1913); Gray v. Marino, 138 W. Va. 585, 76 S.E.2d 585 (1953); Estate of Rosenthal,
247 Wis. 555, 20 N.W.2d 643 (1945).
28. Annot., supra note 25, at 926.
29. See, e.g., 72 AM. Jtr. 2d Statute of Frauds '§ 305 (1974); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF ComxncuS § 207 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); Annot., supra note 25, at
932.
30. McCraw v. Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962); Chason v.
Marley, 224 N.C. 844, 32 S.E.2d 652 (1945); Kluttz v. Allison, 214 N.C. 379, 199 S.E.
395 (1938); Keith v. Bailey, 185 N.C. 262, 116 S.E. 729 (1923).
31. Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N.C. 183, 49 S.E. 104 (1904).
32. Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 136 S.E.2d 269 (1964); Searcy v. Logan, 226 N.C.
562, 39 S.E.2d 593 (1946); Hodges v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E.2d 723 (1940).
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names of both parties to the contract. 3 Those cases from other juris-
dictions which have considered the issue of sufficiency look most fre-
quently to one factor in their determination: whether the will in its
dispositions makes reference to the alleged oral contract.
84
In Rape v. Lyerly the North Carolina court held that a revoked will
could constitute a sufficient memorandum of an oral contract to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds; yet it may be argued that the will in Rape was not
a sufficient memorandum of the contract. For example, one might
argue that the actual words of disposition used by Lyerly in his will do
not refer to a contract to devise. Lyerly stated that he devised his realty
"since" Mildred Rape had "obligated" herself to care for him.85 Such
dispositive terms are amenable to two constructions. First, the testator
could be merely coupling his devise with an explanation for his generosi-
ty to Mildred Rape.36 Such a construction compels the finding that the
will is not a memo of the contract, because a memo must show not
merely the appreciation and intention of one of the parties, but rather
the promises and obligation running between the parties to the con-
tract.3
7
Under the second possible construction, the testator could be
recording the promises and obligations of each party to a contract to
devise. That the devise was to Mildred Rape "since" she served Lyerly
does not, of itself, show the contractual nature of the devise; "since"
merely shows the causal relation between the devise and the service. The
use of the words, "ha[d] obligated", in Lyerly's will, on the other hand.
does show the contractual nature of the devise. Obligation generally
refers to duty or promise arising from legal compulsion; here the only
legal obligation to which the testator could have intended to refer is that
of contract. Moreover, only infrequently or inadvertently does obliga-
33. Elliot v. Owen, 244 N.C. 684, 94 S.E.2d 833 (1956).
34. Kobus v. San Diego Trust & Say. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Busque v. Marcou, 147 Me. 289, 86 A.2d 873 (1952); Southern
v. Kittredge, 85 N.H. 307, 158 A. 132 (1932); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 66 N.J. Super. 246,
168 A.2d 839 (App. Div. 1961); In re Anderson's Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A.2d 301
(1944); Eslick v. Friedman, 191 Tenn. 647, 235 S.W.2d 808 (1951); Upson v. Fitzger-
ald, 129 Tex. 211, 103 S.W.2d 147 (1937); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138,
137 P. 479 (1913); cf. Falk v. Fulton, 124 Kan. 745, 262 P. 1025 (1928); but see
Shroyer v. Smith. 204 Pa. 310, 54 A. 24 (1903).
35. See note 5 supra.
36. Explanatory clauses in wills are not uncommon and serve the useful purpose of
educating family members to the reasons behind the testator's dispositive scheme.
37. See Brown v. Williams, 196 N.C. 247, 145 S.E. 233, (1928), finding that a will
was not a memo of a contract to devise. See also Luders v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 121 Cal. App. 408, 9 P.2d 271 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932), holding that a devise for the
devisee's faithful service to the testator did not serve as a memo of a contract to devise.
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tion refer to an unenforceable, gratuitous promise or to a moral obliga-
tion; such a usage is not generally to be expected in a legal document.
The dispositive terms of the will record the promises and obligations of
the contract and, in doing so, make the reference to a contract that is
required by most cases38 deciding whether a revoked will serves as a
memo of a contract. 9
Lyerly's will identified both parties to the contract and stated the
contract's terms and conditions: devise in return for services. The
testator's signature at the will's excution served as the signature of the
party to be charged; his reference to the location of the realty was a
satisfactory description of it.40 Arguments that the will was not a
sufficient memo were properly rejected by the court.
An objection that can be made to the Rape case concerns that
portion of Chief Justice Sharp's opinion dealing with the right to revoke
a will executed pursuant to a contract.4 A will is ambulatory and
always revokable,42 regardless of a contract to devise or not to revoke.
However, the opinion in Rape, without stating that a will can never be
irrevocable, quotes extensively from sources explaining that a will can-
not be revoked to defeat contractual obligations. To say, as is some-
times said in courts of equity, that relief is granted because a will
becomes irrevocable when executed in compliance with an enforceable
contract 43 is incorrect.4" The meaning of such statements is that,
regardless of revocation, equity will impress a constructive trust upon
the devised realty in favor of the contractual promisee. 45
The distinction between one's right to revoke a will and one's right
38. See note 34 supra.
39. See also Woods v. Dunn, 81 Ore. 457, 159 P. 1158 (1916), where a devise in
return for the home and care of devisee was a sufficient reference to and definition of
the contract to devise.
40. For cases dealing with the sufficiency of the description of realty in a memo
for Statute of Frauds purposes, see, e.g., Carlton v. Anderson, 276 N.C. 564, 173 S.E.2d
783 (1970); Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 136 S.E.2d 269 (1964); Searcy v. Logan, 226
N.C. 562, 39 S.E.2d 593 (1946); Hodges v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E.2d 723
(1940); Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310, 54A. 24 (1903).
41. 287 N.C. at 618, 215 S.E.2d at 748.
42. Cf. T. ATKiNSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WmLs 21S, 224 (1953); 94 C.J.S.
Wills §§ 117, 127(2) (1956); 1 H. UNDERHiLL, A TxAnSE ON THE LAw OF Wirs §
289 (1900).
43. Johnston v. Tomrme, 199- Miss. 337, 24 So. 2d 730 (1946); Annot., 3 A.LR.
172 (1919); B. SPARKs, CoNTRACTs TO MAKE WILLs 111 (1956); Costigan, Constructive
Trusts based upon Promises Made to Secure Bequests, Devises, or Intestate Succession,
28 H v. L. REv. 237, 250 (1915).
44. B. SPARKs, supra note 43, at 111.
45. Costigan, supra note 43, at 250.
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to rescind a contract needs to be drawn. The correct relation between
these rights is that the right to revoke does not give one the right to
rescind. The opinion in Rape fails to state this distinction and incor-
rectly implies that one's inability to rescind a valid contract bars revoca-
tion of the will executed pursuant to the contract. By citing cases"
from other jurisdictions that directly state that execution of a will
pursuant to a contract bars revocation of it,4 7 Rape v. Lyerly propounds
incorrect theories and promotes confusion about the justification for
specific performance of a contract to devise. The correct justification
rests simply upon the breach of contract to devise.
In conclusion, the North Carolina Supreme Court improperly justi-
fied the remedy that it awarded. Nonetheless, the remedy, conclusions,
and holding of the court in Rape v. Lyerly are proper ones. The
court's holding, that a revoked will can provide a sufficient memoran-
dum of an oral agreement for Statute of Frauds purposes, had no North
Carolina precedent but is supported by the weight of authority from
other jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the North Carolina courts' ability
to enforce an oral contract to devise realty evidenced by a will, promi-
sees are well advised to insist upon a separate written instrument con-
taining the promise to devise.
EVERETT B. SASLOW, JR.
Criminal Law-A Survey and Appraisal of the Law of En-
trapment in North Carolina
In attempting to apprehend persons involved in the so-called
victimless crimes,1 modem law enforcement officers have found it
necessary to set traps that are often quite elaborate to obtain evidence
needed for conviction. In setting a trap, it is often necessary for the law
officer or his agent to actually participate in the criminal act. The
46. 287 N.C. at 615, 215 S.E.2d at 748.
47. See, e.g., Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So. 2d 730 (1946). See also
In re Estate of Ranthum, 249 Iowa 790, 89 N.W.2d 337 (1958); Brock v. Noecker, 66
N.D. 567, 267 N.W. 656 (1936).
1. "Victimless crimes" include crimes in which there is no "victim" or in which
the "victim" is a willing participant. Crimes relating to prostitution, homosexuality,
narcotics, liquor sales, and gambling are common examples. See Rotenberg, The Police
Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L Rnv. 871, 874-75 (1963).
982 [Vol. 54
